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Comparing Free Speech: United 
States v. United Kingdom 
One of the major differences between 
the political and legal systems in the 
United States and the United Kingdom is 
the existence in America of a written Con-
stitution. In Britain, Parliament is 
supreme; any Act passed by it is inter-
preted and enforced by the courts. In the 
United States, any statute passed by Con-
gress or by any state legislature must com-
ply with the Constitution. Any statute 
that violates the Constitution will not be 
enforced by the courts. I 
This distinction is readily apparent when 
one studies freedom of speech in the two 
countries. Studying freedom of speech in 
the United Kingdom involves examining 
the ways in which parliamentary acts, and 
to a certain extent the common law, 
restrict free speech in such areas as obsceni-
ty, libel, government secrets, and press 
reporting of trials. While American free 
speech is not absolute, and governmental 
restrictions certainly exist in all of these 
areas, the study of freedom of speech in 
America proceeds from an importantly 
different angle. Rather than studying the 
actual restrictions placed on free speech, 
one looks at the limits placed on such 
restrictions by the first amendment to the 
Constitution.2 
Although there is no equivalent to the 
first amendment in the United Kingdom, 
the British, through a long history recog-
nizing the importance of freedom of 
speech, enjoy some of the greatest freedom 
of any people in the world to write and 
speak their mind. Yet, in a number of 
areas, methods of controlling speech used 
in the United Kingdom would violate the 
first amendment in the United States. This 
article will first examine some areas of dif-
ference in the control of speech in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. 
Then it will examine the extent of those 
differences to determine whether they 
indicate a significantly different treatment 
of free speech rights or whether they are 
merely minor disagreements on the fringe 
of those rights. 
by Professor Stephen J. Shapiro 
I. PRIOR RESTRAINTS 
One of the major differences is the way 
the two countries handle attempts to re-
strain, before publication, material which 
could be punished after publication. In 
both countries certain kinds of speech, for 
example libelous statements or release of 
government secrets, may be actionable. In 
a libel suit, the common law of Britain and 
all American states holds that if a person 
makes untrue, derogatory statements 
about another, he or she may be forced to 
compensate the victim for any harm done 
to their reputation. In Britain, however, 
unlike the United States, if the victim dis-
covered that a libelous statement was 
about to be published, he or she might 
have the publication enjoined.3 Courts in 
the United Kindgom do not necessarily 
make a distinction between prior restraint 
and post-hoc punishment of improper or 
illegal speech. Any impermissible speech 
which is subject to punishment might also 
be subject to injunction. In the United 
States, however, even speech which may 
be punished may not normally be sub-
jected to prior restraint. 
In the 1931 case of Near v. Jlinneso~ 4 
the United States Supreme Court struck 
down an injunction which prohibited a 
newspaper from publishing any "mali-
cious, scandalous or defamatory"S 
material. The only remedy for a libel vic-
tim in the United States is to sue for 
damages after the publication. In the 
United States, the public'S right to know is 
held paramount over the danger of irrepa-
rable harm that might be done to an indi-
vidual. 
The British system, on the other hand, is 
more concerned with the right of the indi-
vidual, since a person's reputation might 
be irreparably harmed by a libelous publi-
cation which he was powerless to prevent 
because of the restrictions on prior re-
straint. In Britain, a hearing could be 
required before publication in order to 
determine if the article were libelous. If a 
hearing did find the article libelous, the 
article could be enjoined, and it could be 
argued that no harm is done in suppressing 
an article clearly found to be defamatory 
and untrue. If the article were found not 
defamatory or were found to be true, pub-
lication would be allowed. Thus, an article 
deserving of publication might be delayed, 
but could be published eventually. Under 
the British system, therefore, an individu-
al's right to an undamaged reputation is 
viewed as more important than the imme-
diate right to publish the article. 
The difference between the two coun-
tries as to the difficulty in obtaining 
injunctions against publication has also 
shown itself in the area of national securi-
ty. In 1971, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the government had not 
met its "heavy burden of showing justifica-
tion" for enjoining publication of the Pen-
tagon Papers, a classified study of United 
States' decisionmaking on Viet Nam 
policy.6 The Court has, in dicta, indicated 
that in very limited circumstances, such as 
"publication of the sailing dates of trans-
ports or· the number and location of 
troops"7 in time of war, an injunction 
might be issued. The Court has shown, 
however, that it will be very difficult for 
the government to prove that publication 
"will surely result in direct, immediate, 
and irreparable damage to our nation or its 
people."8 
In the United Kingdom, the courts have 
been more willing to grant injunctions 
against publications containing confiden-
tial governmental information when it is 
·'in the national interest" to do SO.9 In a 
recent high-profile case, British courts 
enjoined newspaper publication of the 
book, Spycatcher, the memoirs of a former 
British intelligence officer.lo The injunc-
tion was only dissolved after the publica-
tion of the book in the United States had 
destroyed the secrecy of its contents. The 
British Official Secrets Act is a very strin-
gent law which makes it a criminal offense 
for any government employee to divulge 
any information which was ·'entrusted to 
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him in confidence"l1 even if that informa-
tion is not in any way sensitive or its 
release would not in any way harm the 
government. 
The American government has taken a 
different approach to halting release of 
confidential information by its agents. All 
CIA agents must sign an agreement 
promising not to publish any information 
gained during the course of their 
employment, without permission of the 
agency. In Snepp v. United States, 12 the 
government obtained a constructive trust 
on all income earned by a former CIA 
agent from a book he had written about 
the agency without its prior approval. This 
holding and judgment will prove to be a 
great deterrent to such books in the future. 
In another aspect involving national 
security, the Thatcher government quite 
recently has announced significant and 
controversial press restrictions in connec-
tion with the Northern Ireland dispute. 
Using its general power to control broad-
casting, the government has banned the 
radio and television broadcast of the direct 
statements of members of eleven named 
"terrorist" organizations, including Sinn 
Fein and the Ulster Defense Association. 
Such a restriction would clearly be 
unconstitutional in the United States and, 
in fact, is currently being challenged in the 
British courts by the National Union of 
Journalists and Sinn Fein. 
II. LmEL 
A second major difference between the 
two countries in free speech rights is in the 
area of libel law. In both the United States 
and Great Britain, libel developed as a 
common law tort. Although the law has 
been codified by Parliamentary Act in 
Britain, IJ both have virtually identical ele-
ments and defenses. Until the 1960's, li-
belous statements were not given any 
constitutional protection by the United 
States Supreme Court. Libel was con-
sidered, along with obscenity and fighting 
words, among "certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any constitu-
tional problem." 14 This doctrine regarding 
libel was changed in the decision of New 
York Times v. Sullivan. 15 
The Sullivan decision imposed, for the 
first time, constitutional restrictions on 
the way states applied their libel law to the 
media. The Court held that public officials 
could not recover damages for defamatory 
falsehoods relating to their official conduct 
unless they could prove that the state-
ments were made with "actual malice" -
that is, with actual knowledge that it was 
false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not. The Court reasoned 
that libel law, even with the defense of 
truth, deterred not only false, but also true 
speech. Critics might be deterred from 
voicing even true criticism "because of 
doubt whether it can be proved in court or 
fear of the expense of having to do SO."16 
The Court also held that public officials 
could not recover presumed damages for 
injuries to their reputations but must 
prove actual damages before recovering. 
Subsequent cases have extended the SuI· 
livan defense to cases involving public 
figures l7 and, to a somewhat lesser degree, 
private persons involved in matters of pub-
lic interest. 18 
The news media in the United Kingdom 
do not enjoy nearly so broad a privilege as 
in the United States. For the most part, 
libel plaintiffs may recover regardless of 
whether the media defendant was at fault 
for printing the false statement. 19 Also, if 
the defamatory statement is "calculated to 
disparage the plaintiff in any office, profes-
sion, calling, trade or business," it is not 
necessary for the plaintiff to prove :I.ctual 
damages in order to recover.20 Newspapers 
are only granted a privilege for non-
malicious libel if the defamatory state-
ments are contained in a "fair and acrurate 
report" of various governmental proceed-
ings, such as court trials or proceedings in 
Parliament.21 
Group libel laws present another 
interesting comparison. Such laws prohibit 
dissemination of derogatory information 
about groups or classes of people (i.e., 
races or religions) which might incite 
hatred against such groups. The United 
States Supreme Court upheld a prosecu-
tion under such a law in Beauharnais v. 
Illinois. 22 There, the Court refused to 
require a defense that the words must con-
stitute "a clear and present danger" of 
inciting violence because libelous utter-
ances were "not within the area of consti-
tutionally protected speech."2J 
The Beauharnais case has not been 
explicitly overruled. Based on New Yark 
Times v. Sullivan and other more recent 
cases which have given a me3S).lre of consti-
tutional protection to libelous statements, 
however, some commentators believe that 
Beauharnais is no longer good law and, 
therefore, that group libel laws are 
unconstitutional.24 Since only a few states 
have such laws and they are rarely, if ever, 
invoked, no definitive answer is available 
as to their constitutionality. 
The United Kingdom does have a group 
libel law. The Race Relations Act of 1976 
prohibits any person from using "threat-
ening, abusive or insulting" words, where 
"having regard to all the circumstances, 
hatred is likely to be stirred up against any 
racial group in Great Britain."25 Although 
a few successful proserutions have been 
brought under the statute, the government 
has made little use of it.26 
One area of the law closely related to 
group libel is blasphemous libel. In Eng-
land it is a crime to insult, offend, or vilify 
Christ or the Christian religion.27 In 1979, 
the Gay News was found guilty of blasphe-
mous libel for publishing a poem and a 
drawing portraying Christ as a homosexu-
al. The jury was instructed that any 
writing which in an offensive manner 
tended to vilify Christ could be a blasphe-
mous libel, and that the publication need 
not amount to an attack on Christianity, 
nor need it be proved that there was a sub-
jective intent on the part of the accused to 
attack the Christian religion.28 
The crime of blasphemous libel would 
be unconstitutional in the United States. 
Not only would it violate the free speech 
clause of the first amendment, but it would 
also violate the first amendment religious 
establishment clause.29 Because the poem 
in the British Gay News case was described 
as obscene, however, it might not have 
received first amendment free speech pro-
tection because of its obscenity if the case 
was brought in the United States. But since 
the poem was subject to prosecution not 
because it was obscene, but because it was 
blasphemous, the prosecution would still 
have violated the religious establishment 
clause by giving special protection to the 
Christian religion. 
An interesting comparison can be drawn 
on the treatment accorded Martin 
Scorcese's recent film, The Last Temptation 
of Christ. Although no proserution in 
Great Britain has yet been brought against 
the film, that is a possibility. In the United 
States, however, no proserution for blas-
phemous libel could be brought to stop 
distribution of the film. Yet, widespread 
picketing against the showing of the film 
has caused it not to be shown by large 
movie chains in many cities, including Bal-
timore.JI The same first amendment rights 
which protect the film from proserution 
here also grant picketers the right to pro-
test against and perhaps hinder its distribu-
tion. 
III. OBSCENITY 
It is in the area of obscenity that the law 
of the United States and the United King-
dom are probably the closest. This is 
because "obscene material is unprotected 
by the first amendment."J2 Obscenity has 
been defined by the United States Supreme 
Court as material which, taken as a whole, 
would be viewed by the average person, 
applying contemporary community stand-
ards, as appealing to the prurient interest; 
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which describes sexual conduct in a patent-
ly offensive way; and which lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value.33 Unlike libelous publications, 
which may be punished but not en-
joined,34 obscene publications may be en-
joined.3s In fact, the United States 
Supreme Court has upheld a system 
requiring all films to be submitted for 
examination to determine whether they 
are obscene before receiving the necessary 
license to be shown.36 Such "censorship" 
would clearly not be allowed in other areas 
of speech, but it is closer to the general 
British approach to regulation of speech. 
In England obscenity is basically con-
trolled by the Obscene Publications Act of 
1959.31 The test for obscenity contained in 
the Obscene Publications Act is somewhat 
different than the American definition. 
The Act defines material as obscene if its 
effect, taken as a whole, is "to tend to 
deprave and corrupt" persons who are 
likely to read, see or hear it.38 There is a 
defense if the publication is "justified as 
being for the public good on the ground 
that it is in the interests of science, litera-
ture, art or learning, or of other interests 
of general concern."39 Obscenity is regu-
lated differently in Scotland because the 
Obscene Publications Act does not apply 
there. Since this act does not apply to Scot-
land, other laws, including the recently 
developed common law offense of shame-
lessly indecent conduct, apply there.40 
Where the United States and England 
differ is their treatment of pornography, as 
opposed to obscenity. Ordinances recently 
passed in several American cities have tried 
to control pornography, which is general-
ly defined as "the graphic sexually explicit 
subordination of women, whether in pic-
tures or words."41 Such an ordinance has 
been held unconstitutional by the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit because 
it regulates the content of speech, by man-
dating a preferred viewpoint of women.42 
Although the court accepted the proposi-
tion that pornography has the effect of 
encouraging those who see it to commit 
acts of violence against women, the court 
rejected the idea of trying to control the 
behavior of persons by controlling the 
ideas which they read and see. In England, 
however, the Obscene Publications Act, 
with its "tend to deprave and corrupt" lan-
guage, seems to be directed at the effects 
the pornography has on the observer. 
Therefore, without the first amendment 
protection of the content of speech, the 
English Act seems broad enough to accom-
plish the regulation of pornography which 
was denied the City of Indianapolis. It has, 
in fact, been used against material portray-
ing violence and other material which 
would not be held obscene in the United 
StateS.43 
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON TRIAL 
PUBliCITY 
One final area where British restrictions 
on the press would probably violate the 
United States Constitution is the control 
of pretrial publicity. In the United 
Kingdom, any publication about active 
court proceedings which "creates a 
substantial risk that the course of justice in 
the proceedings in question will be 
seriously impeded or prejudiced" is 
prohibited and may be punished as a 
criminal violation.44 General discussions 
of matters of public interest are not 
prohibited, however, merely because a 
trial is going on involving the same subject 
matter.4S For example, an anti-abortion 
article appearing during the trial of a 
doctor for an illegal abortion was held not 
to be a violation, since the doctor's specific 
case was not mentioned and any threat of 
prejudice was deemed "merely 
incidental."46 Fair and accurate reports of 
public legal proceedings are also protected. 
The prohibition applies to published facts 
about a specific case between the time of 
arrest and the time of sentencing (the Act 
applies to civil as well as criminal cases). 
The rationale is to avoid prejudice to the 
defendant which would occur if the jury 
were to read or hear facts concerning the 
case, other than those presented in court. 
The Act does not actually prohibit 
publication of all facts about a case, but 
only those which would seriously 
prejudice the trial. Most newspapers, 
however, in order to be on the safe side, 
publish virtually nothing except the actual 
testimony presented in court until a 
criminal trial is concluded. 
This procedure is contrary to the 
American practice, especially in 
sensational trials, of publishing every bit of 
information obtained about the case. 
Although there is concern in the United 
States about the effect of such pretrial 
publicity, no blanket prohibition such as 
the British Contempt of Court Act is 
permitted. Instead, any prohibition on 
pretrial publicity must be issued by the 
judge on a case by case basis. Although the 
United States Supreme Court has 
recognized the dangers to a fair trial 
because of too much publicity,.7 it has also 
severely restricted a judge's right to issue 
"gag orders" prohibiting dissemination of 
information about a case. The Court has 
not completely eliminated the use of such 
orders, but has required that a very heavy 
burden be met before they can be imposed 
and that they be as narrowly tailored as 
possible,,8 Other steps to avoid prejudice, 
such as jury sequestration or change of 
venue, must be attempted before the judge 
may consider issuing even a narrow gag 
order. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Any comparative law study necessarily 
concentrates on the differences between 
the law of two countries, rather than the 
similarities. This may exaggerate any 
differences that may exist. By giving 
examples of British laws which violate the 
American first amendment, it may seem 
that there is significantly less freedom of 
speech in the United Kingdom. It is easy to 
lose sight of the fact that Britons historical-
ly have, and still do, exercise some of the 
broadest free speech rights of any people 
on earth, especially in their ability to 
criticize the government, a most 
important bellwether of free speech rights. 
Our American concept of free speech 
developed directly from the British, and in 
many important respects, the free speech 
rights exercised in both countries are quite 
similar. 
It is important to note that in each of the 
areas studied in this article, it is not the 
case that the United Kingdom allows 
controls over a particular kind of speech 
whereas that same speech is given absolute 
protection in the United States. In spite of 
the absolute-sounding language of the first 
amendment, it has never been so 
interpreted. In the United States, some 
controls are allowed in the areas of libel, 
government secrets, obscenity, and trial 
reporting. In all these areas, a balance must 
be struck between allowing free discussion 
and preventing harm to individuals or the 
public. The balance has been struck in 
some cases at a different point in Great 
Britain than in the United States. Most of 
those choices, however, seem to be a 
legitimate, albeit different, balancing of 
rights, rather than merely an illegitimate 
attempt to stifle debate or to protect the 
government from criticism. 
It is the author's viewpoint that British 
law seems to have gone astray in the area 
of blasphemous libel because it controls 
speech for reasons other than protecting 
against actual harm. Unlike ordinary libel, 
which protects an individual from the 
harmful effects of untrue statements, the 
courts have stated that the purpose of 
blasphemous libel is to protect "a 
Christian's feelings" from insult.49 This 
does not seem to be a valid reason to 
control speech. It must be remembered, 
however, that historically in the United 
States, obscenity has not been subject to 
control because of proof of actual harm to 
persons, but because it was "without 
redeeming social importance."so 
The most important difference between 
the two countries is the much greater 
difficulty there is in the United States to 
restrain, rather than punish, publication, 
regardless of the grounds. If one is willing 
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to take the risk of punishment, an individ-
ual will always be able to communicate his 
or her ideas. The public will have the bene-
fit of the information even if the speaker is 
eventually punished. It is also important to 
note that any punishment (either criminal 
or in the form of civil damages) will be 
meted out by a jury, whereas injunctions 
are granted by judges. One should not lose 
sight of the fact, however, that there is 
some cost to the system used in the United 
States. If an individual is punished for 
speech that could not be restrained, this 
means that someone's rights may have 
been violated by the speaker. Unlike the 
British, America is willing to take this risk 
in order to maximize the free exchange of 
ideas. 
Given that Britain does not have a pro-
tection for free speech akin to a first 
amendment, it is noteworthy that Parlia-
ment has chosen not to impose more con-
trols than it has in the area of free speech. 
The first amendment is still important, 
however, even though the United King-
dom, without one, does not suffer signifi-
cantly less rights of free speech than the 
United States. It is important to remember 
that just because Parliament has chosen to 
exercise self-restraint in this area, there is 
no guarantee that it will continue forever 
to do so. It is conceivable that it could suc-
comb to political pressure to stifle debate 
and, in that circumstance, there would be 
no document binding on them that would 
prohibit it. One can only imagine what 
American society would be like without 
the restrictions of the first amendment. It 
is possible that American legislatures, in 
that instance, would not show as much 
self-restraint as Parliament and, therefore, 
significantly greater controls on speech 
could exist in this country than presently 
exist in Britain. 
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SUMMER lAW PROGRAM IN 
ABERDEEN, SCOTlAND 
Professor Shapiro taught in the Sum-
mer Law Program in Aberdeen, Scot-
land, this past summer. The Summer 
Law Program is sponsored jointly by 
the University of Baltimore and the 
University of Maryland. It provides 
American law students the opportuity 
to study comparative law for six weeks 
at the University of Aberdeen, one of 
the oldest and most beautiful universi-
ties in Great Britain. 
Courses are team-taught by members 
of the University of Baltimore and 
Maryland faculty, along with faculty 
members of the University of Aber-
deen. This article grew out of material 
presented in a course entitled Compara-
tive Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
taught by Professor Shapiro and three 
members of the University of Aberdeen 
faculty. The course compared freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion, and 
employment discrimination laws in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. 
The author wishes to thank Professor 
Colin Reid of the University of Aber-
deen for his assistance in preparing the 
article. 
The Summer Law Program will be 
held this year from June 27 through 
August 4, 1989. The courses for this 
summer's program will include Com-
parative Criminal Justire and Profes-
sional Responsibility: Comparative 
Legal Professions. Cost of the program 
is approximately two thousand dollars 
for tuition, program fees, and room and 
board. Students interested in participat-
ing should contact Dean Laurence Katz, 
at the University of Baltimore. 
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